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Costs of Cooperation Rather than Competition in the 
Provision of Justice? 
 
The civil law reforms starting in the USA and exemplified by Lord Woolf’s reform 
package(1995; 1996) in the U.K. are considered in the context of diminishing legal aid 
and pressure on judges to become case managers responsible for the economic 
performance of their courts. The reforms are being sold in a package that promises a 
fairer system for all, greater access, cheaper and quicker justice, less stress and greater 
party control. This move from the welfare state to a civil society is analysed using 
Habermas’s critical theory in an effort to uncover and debate its assumptions. Specific 
recent changes in civil procedure in Queensland are referred to in this context. 
 
 
Law and order exist for the purpose of establishing justice and when they fail in this purpose they 
become the dangerously structured dams that block the flow of social progress (King 1963) 
 
The public is aware of the debate 
surrounding the impact of the new 
accountability procedures in their 
application to public health, education and 
more recently tertiary education sectors. 
The effects of new accountabilities on the 
democratic process in the context of our 
public justice system and its outcomes in 
the longer term are only now starting to be 
considered (Hanger 2002; Hinchy 2002). 
The work of the critical theorist Habermas 
(1971 ; 1987) provides a useful mechanism 
by which this process of change can be 
understood and critiqued. Habermas’s 
theory of communication, based on what 
he describes as ‘system’ and ‘lifeworld’, 
depicts the colonising of the lifeworld of 
law as institutions by systems, or the 
procedural imperatives of the law. He 
argues that this occurs at two levels. First, 
the invasion into the provision of justice of 
accounting systems language leads to 
informalism, namely the adoption of 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
methods. Second, the lifeworld method of 
conflict resolution through informal 
mediation is itself being colonised by the 
law through the process of juridification 
(Langer 1998). The accounting 
technologies demand a new overriding 
objective namely efficiency, speed and 
effectiveness (Andrews 2000).1
The swift way in which these 
reforms are being taken up around the 
world has left little room for public 
debate, other than in some rarefied 
academic and elite spaces. Citizens, 
while gradually experiencing the impacts, 
have little ability to construct their 
opposition, the horse having already bolted 
(Spigelman 2001).2 Government needs to 
be able to consult with its citizens 
involving them in policy making to 
develop solutions in a proactive way rather 
than allowing colonising media to 
determine public policy in crisis situations 
(Lau 2000).3
There is a need to look behind the 
systems justification at the lifeworld 
dimensions and see who really benefits 
from these reforms. A valid argument is 
that the accounting changes are not 
introduced to solve specific problems such 
as cost and access to the legal system 
(these have been around for hundreds of 
years) (Auerbach 1983:95) but rather to 
express an ideological commitment to the 
free market economy for the benefit of the 
agenda-setting elite, wealthy groups and 
corporations (Sibley 2002). 
The question arises whether the 
civil reforms are likely to achieve what 
proponents claim, specifically in regard to 
access to justice. Secondary sources are 
reviewed for the growing literature both 
justifying (Harris 2000; Silbey  & Sarat 
1995:437)4 and criticising these reforms 
(Andrews 2000; Galanter & Cahill 1993; 
O'Brien 1999) which include the adoption 
of ADR methods in an increasing 
juridification of the settlement process. 
The effects of the reforms on the access to 
justice, rule of law and wider democratic 
and cultural process are considered. It is 
clear that some writers, judges and lawyers 
are concerned about the different 
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conceptions of appropriate economic and 
social policy and its implications in the 
reforming process (Auerbach 1983; 
Spigelman 2001).  The lack of 
consideration of such broader values 
diminishes society. 
Shared values such as democracy 
and equal treatment under the 
law also shape citizens’ desires. 
Without these values, citizens are 
more likely to focus only on 
short-sighted services based on 
narrow interests (Lau 2000:27). 
 
Reforms are so wide-ranging as 
to prohibit a thorough overview; specific 
reference is made to two particular 
Queensland reforms. Part 2 of the 
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules provide 
for summary judgement and s102 (3) of 
the Supreme Court of Queensland Act 
1991 introduces case appraisal. Both are 
designed to reduce the courts’ caseloads 
by preventing matters reaching trial and 
by diverting matters once introduced in 
the courts. There is an urgent need to 
open this debate and look at the 
implications of institutional and societal 
changes affected by the civil procedure 
reforms. The way disputes are resolved 
and the practice of the law has impacts 
for concepts such as the rule of law. The 
economic theory of allocative efficiency 
treats recipients of justice as ‘clients’ 
with the courts being seen as service 
providers. Such notions deny the broader 
role of courts as political institutions that, 
through the rule of law and the provision 
of substantive justice, act in the lifeworld 
of norm creation and are not just there for 
litigant clients. 
The law has a long tradition of 
providing a mechanism for society to 
have its laws upheld and observed based 
on an understanding of the rule of law. 
Sir Laurence Street, former Chief Justice 
of NSW, has clearly defined the position 
of the courts as having an inherent 
sovereign duty as the fiduciary custodian 
of the rule of law to apply and enforce it. 
CJ Street affirms that there can never be 
any other mechanism for this function 
just as we cannot: 
 …countenance any alternative 
parliament or legislature; we may 
provide, and indeed, we do 
provide, additional or delegated 
mechanisms whereby to legislate 
or regulate. Again, we cannot 
countenance any alternative to the 
executive authority of the 
sovereign such as, for example, a 
military executive power structure. 
And so it is with the judicial 
branch of government, the court 





Gone are government by bureaucracy, 
direct planning and citizenship with 
universal entitlement bounded by the 
rhetoric of equal opportunity. Instead 
states use market control, with contracts, 
audits, risk management and the 
competitive, responsible self and 
community, defined in neo-liberal terms. 
The decentralised but increased control by 
the state is achieved through its direct 
control of funding formulae linked to 
contractual outcomes which set defined 
state objectives in a way that ignores the 
local community vision (Harrington 
1985:64). A example of how this works is 
government influence over specific tertiary 
sector courses with the encouragement of 
some professions and discouragement of 
others (such as law) through its HECS fee 
structure (Finney, Leslie & Stojanovich 
2002).5
 
The ideological commitment to small 
government inspired by Milton Friedman 
(Moore 2003) in the Thatcher (Bevan, 
Davis & Pearce 1999:240) and Reagan 
years – resulted in deregulation and an 
attack on the Keynesian model of the 
welfare state. No longer are taxes used to 
provide for all to have access to justice 
through a fair and democratic legal aid 
system (see Regan 2000). Somewhat 
surprisingly, this commitment to small 
government was taken up in the West by 
subsequent labour governments – Hawke, 
Blair, and Clarke and is still being 
followed.  
Contemporary public reform is 
more likely to be driven by ideas, 
often borrowed from private sector 
management literature. In OECD 
countries, several political schools 
of thought such as Tony Blair’s 
“New Labour”, Bill Clinton’s the 
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“Third Way” and Gerhard 
Schroeder’s “New Centre” are 
attempting to balance traditional 
ideologies with a more pragmatic 
perspective that focuses on 
economic performance (Lau 
2000:37).  
 
This ideological perspective persists 
despite the murmuring following the 
ENRON and HIH (Dixon 2002) 
collapses, and September 11, that there is 
a place for bigger and more 
interventionist government in the market 
place to protect society. 
A civil society may argue that 
temporary hardships and suffering are 
necessary if people are to stand on their 
own feet and overturn a culture of 
dependency. Lindquist, in an OECD 
report, has suggested a ‘common vision 
shared across different parts of 
government: that governments actively 
seek ways to best use tax dollars and 
public resources, no matter the political 
history or administrative context’ (Lau 
2000:40). This statement is indicative in 
its noticeable omission of an important 
element of the equation, namely the 
‘social context’.  Economic theory that 
sees the market as a site for allocation 
and efficiency alone fails in its inability 
to accommodate irrational/emotional 
beings acting in a social sphere. 
Governments are tending to 
perceive themselves as businesses with 
the taxpayer much like a shareholder 
whose interests must be kept uppermost 
at all costs. This does not sit well with 
the concept of government and society 
regulating through its tax system the 
redistribution of income in the interests 
of a healthy functioning civil society for 
all, not just the components who are 
taxpayers. Society is responsible for 
children, the aged, the imprisoned and all 
members, including non-taxpayers.  
Historically governments have 
made justice problematic by claiming 
inefficiencies. This perennial argument 
has been used to demand constant reform 
intended, it is claimed, to lead to 
efficiency and fairness (Auerbach 
1983:115). One only has to look at the 
historical record of ADR, proclaimed as 
the solution of problems in the past. It 
didn’t then, and now is just as unlikely 
to, solve these problems (Auerbach 1983; 
Harrington 1985). The question is will the 
public realise too late and demand a return 
to the goal of ensuring principles of 
substantive justice aligned with the rule of 
law to balance economic interests.  
Customer surveys have shown 
little dissatisfaction with the adjudication 
system6 (see Silbey 2002). Yet 
government funding is being transferred to 
private providers of ADR and the question 
arises how this compares with the cost of 
providing legal aid and well-resourced 
public courts. Leibenstein’s (1987) 
concept of non-competition leading to 
greater organisational inefficiencies, 
known as X-efficiency, can be used to 
justify opening courts to competition in the 
provision of dispute settlement. However 
in application to social and political 
institutions this places the notion of value 
for money, higher than other values such 
as openness, fairness, impartiality, 
legitimacy and honesty, all aspects that are 
important with social institutions such as 
the courts. There is a risk that mediation 
will attract a new market of disputes that 
would have never reached the courts 
previously, instead being resolved in the 
social/ lifeworld. Any savings of legal aid 
costs may be more than absorbed by the 
attraction of new cases to ADR (Bevan, 
Davis & Pearce 1999:248). 
The response in the legal sphere 
has been a move to increase judicial 
control through case management and civil 
procedure reform (Andrews 2000; O'Brien 
1999; Spigelman 2001).  NSW Chief 
Justice Spigelman describes the new 
managerial approach as adapted from the 
private sector, which presupposes that free 
operation of market forces equals an 
efficient use of resources. This approach 
uses a hierarchy of recording and 
measuring strategies dependent on being 
‘...measurable, concrete, collectable at 
reasonable cost and comparable, either 
between institutions or over time for the 
one institution’ (Spigelman 2001:2). In 
Australia the Report on Government 
Services is used to provide these tables of 
comparison which, as Chief Justice 
Spigelman points out, contain footnotes 
with qualifications that are often ignored 
by the media and others who wish to use 
the simple power of numbers to argue their 
case ( 2001:3).  
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The recent focus on 
measurement in a structure of 
decision making perceived to be 
rational – overriding and often 
replacing an approach, which 
emphasises the significance of 
judgment – is not new. In the 
United States there has been a 
succession of fashionable 
schemes: in the 1950s there was 
“performance budgeting”. In the 
1960s there was “program 
budgeting”; in the 1970s there 
was “management by objectives” 
and in the 1980s the current 
approach developed culminating 
in the hierarchy of 
documentation required by the 
Government Performance and 
Results Act 1993. Each of the 
previous approaches was 
accepted to be a failure 
(Spigelman 2001:2).  
 
Reform has often been introduced 
abruptly (Sullivan 2003). In the arena of 
health we have seen how public hospitals 
have been transformed into commercial 
enterprises and dependence on private 
insurance has increased, with rising 
premiums despite government promises 
to the contrary (Shultz 2003).7 Parallels 
can be seen to be developing in the 
reform of the justice system. Litigants 
have now become ‘clients’ and justice is 
a marketable commodity with 
sophisticated accounting and information 
systems introduced to report 
inefficiencies.   
None of this takes into account 
the role of the courts in a democratic 
system of government (Moore 2003). 
Just as the role of hospitals was to treat 
sick people, improve community heath 
and eliminate disease, now the overriding 
factor is cost considerations and efficient 
expenditure of taxpayer money. In the 
same way the settlement of the greatest 
number of cases with the least cost to 
government (taxpayers) is now the 
imperative, not whether justice (whatever 
that may mean) has been seen to be done 
in the minds of the parties and the public. 
The critical theory of Habermas provides 
a basis to critique the new business 




Habermas introduced the term 
‘legitimation crisis’ to capture the 
problems facing Western capitalist 
societies (1971; 1987). Habermas argues 
that the instrumental reasoning associated 
with capitalism is penetrating deeply into 
everyday experience. This is occurring 
through the colonising of the social sphere 
by system technologies such as accounting 
and the distortion of communication, so 
that the understanding of human values 
such as truth and honesty are replaced by 
the rationality of science and technology 
(Harrington 1985:48; Silbey & Sarat 
1995:463). The instruments for invasion of 
the lifeworld are the process of 
identification and management of risk, 
extensive and derogatory public 
commentary, reports of system logic, and 
troubleshooting through mechanisms of 
internal self review, performance 
appraisal, reviews of management 
structure, policy choice in the market, staff 
reviews and external audit. By placing 
these important issues on political agendas 
through critical reports, tighter ‘big 
brother’ surveillance occurs. In the pursuit 
of market driven competitiveness where 
the citizens are encouraged to self-
responsibility, the neo-liberal social 
settlement, already unstable, becomes 
dependent on ideology to manage and 
repress conflicts and power struggles that 
boil under the surface.  
Habermas views social evolution 
as producing an increasingly complex and 
diverse society. According to Habermas 
(1987) society is composed of both 
‘lifeworld’ and ‘system’. The lifeworld is 
the place in which we grow up, it is about 
the shared meanings, norms and culture 
that are developed by the group. These 
social communications create the 
commonly shared values and the 
background for the formation of a 
legitimate self in relation to society. 
A successful world according to 
Habermas holds lifeworld and system in 
balance with the lifeworld holding priority. 
The system’s motivation is efficiency and 
consistency achieved through rational 
economic actions and accountability. 
Habermas’s specific formulation of the 
law, mirroring the system/lifeworld 
dichotomy, is the law as the steering 
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medium reflecting system concerns 
through the procedural aspects of the law, 
guiding the application of law and not 
concerned with substantive issues of right 
and wrong and the law as an institution.  
Law’s role in the lifeworld concerns the 
collective morality applied by judges to 
address substantive issues of social 
concern so that it can mobilise social 
change: Mabo v Queensland (No.2)8 
being a case in point. 
Habermas distinguishes between 
two kinds of linguistic action in the 
lifeworld and system, namely success-
orientated action, and understanding 
orientated action. Success-orientated 
action is associated with rational 
scientific knowledge and relates to 
‘work’ and ‘system’. Such reasoning is 
realised in the action of administrative 
areas of modern society coordinated by 
money and power.  Capitalist ideological 
agenda-setters increasingly utilise this 
system language to erode the 
communicative arena of public debate in 
the lifeworld. The move toward the 
courts controlling cases restricts judges 
and lawyers to consideration of success 
only in terms of a profitable business.  
Habermas argues for the 
reinvigorating of the public sphere by the 
opposition of the colonisation of the 
lifeworld that occurs often through the 
process of juridification, a process of 
increased legal regulation. Habermas 
identifies ADR as a method for the 
lifeworld to fight back against 
juridification or the invasion of the social 
space of informal dispute resolution. 
However, the ADR envisaged by 
Habermas is not the juridified ADR of 
today. With the enthusiastic uptake of 
ADR in the civil reform process, ADR 
has been invaded by the system and now 
is a tool for courts in their case 
management strategies used in the name 
of efficiency (Langer 1998:181 Tasson 
1999).9
Lifeworld and system come into 
conflict in complex, capitalistic societies. 
The steering media that mediate between 
the lifeworld and the system are the 
institutions that are responsible for the 
invasion of the lifeworld. Rather than 
expressions of the lifeworld, that is, 
courts applying substantive justice as has 
become the understood norm in society, 
the courts become the steering media by 
which the lifeworld is colonised when the 
court becomes an instrument for diverting 
cases to avoid overspending budgets, 
rather than applying justice. 
Habermas’s legitimation crisis 
arises because of inequalities that cannot 
be justified. Communication becomes 
systematically distorted when agenda-
setter interests attempt by deception and 
public relations techniques to legitimate 
inequalities. Distortion also occurs when 
established interests avoid humanitarian 
and social concerns by the use of 
misleading rhetoric, such as the view that 
the public sector is less efficient than the 
private. This distorted communication is 
destructive of democratic institutions. 
Deceptiveness is epitomised by the reform 
of legal aid and civil justice under the 
rhetoric of access to justice. This concept 
is misleading when individuals find that it 
doesn’t mean greater access to the courts 
but in fact the reverse, whereby there is an 
intention to diminish access to the courts 
by directing disputes to alternative 
mechanisms instead (Fiss 1995). 
Big business prefers individuals to 
be part of a responsible civil society and 
not dependent on handouts from the state. 
A recent example is the Australian 
government’s new ‘shared-responsibility’ 
policy in relation to indigenous peoples.  
Governments may boast of balanced 
budgets with improved state finances but 
at the cost of an ever-widening gulf in the 
inequality of its citizens, such that one 
must not only have an arguable case but 
one with certain prospects of success to be 
heard by a court. This leaves begging the 
fate of Donoghue v Stevenson10 (the snail 
in the bottle case) in today’s world 
(Hanger 2002:4). That such cases are 
prevented from reaching a public forum 
undermines not only the development of 
precedent but also the opportunity for 
social change. 
Charities and some NGOs are 
raising their voices in concern over the 
increasing number of citizens living in 
poverty. This suggests that a more useful 
measure of the health of a community is 
not whether it has a surplus budget but 
rather how it treats its most vulnerable 
(ABS 1996). How a society lives and 
responds are just as important gauges as 
inflation, interest rates and economic 
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recovery. Not all human needs can be 
resolved by dollars.  
Chief Justice Spigelman 
advocates resistance to the move by 
states to invade the lifeworld sphere of 
the courts. 
Courts do not deliver a “service.” 
The courts administer justice in 
accordance with the law...they 
serve the people but they do not 
provide services to litigants... it 
is not simply a publicly funded 
dispute resolution centre. The 
enforcement of legal rights and 
obligations, the articulation and 
development of the law, the 
resolution of private disputes by 
public affirmation of who is right 
and who is wrong, the 
denunciation of conduct in both 
criminal and civil trials, the 
deterrence of conduct by a public 
process with public outcomes – 
these are all public purposes 
served by the courts, even in the 
resolution of private disputes. An 
economist might call them 
“externalities”. They constitute 
collectively, a core function of 
government... the constitutional 
role of the courts... is incapable 
of reduction to qualitative 
measurement. The judgments of 
courts are part of a broader 
public discourse by which a 
society and polity affirms its core 
values, applies them and adapts 
them to changing circumstances 
(2001:8). 
 
Civil justice reforms 
 
 Developed countries minimised the 
discrimination in access to courts and the 
type of dispute resolution obtained in the 
welfare state by the redistribution of 
taxes so that legal aid was available to 
those who could not afford to bring a 
matter to court. The Swedish system of 
legal aid provided an excellent example 
of democratic access to justice in 
operation, until its dismantling through 
reforms (Regan 2000). 
The USA started raising 
questions in the 1970s about efficiency 
and fairness as part of the move to 
smaller government and economic 
rationalisation (Harrington 1985:76). 
Concern was raised regarding the equity of 
having a government funded legal aid 
system to which allocative mechanisms of 
the pricing system had not been applied. 
With little solid evidence of the costs of 
individual conflict resolution procedures 
or ability to measure their efficiency or 
effectiveness there was still a push to 
informalism (Galanter & Cahill 1993; 
Zander 2003). What can be the basis for 
measuring justice: the dollar cost to 
parties; the cost to society for adjudicating 
disputes; avoiding conflict; settling 
disputes; whether one party is happy; 
whether both are happy or neither; whether 
fewer matters reach the courts; whether 
violence and social harmony are on the 
decrease or increase? What is the measure 
of the effectiveness and efficiency of a 
legal system? (see  McEwen & Wissler 
2002: 140-42). Indeed, as Chief Justice 
Spigelman questions, should these 
standards ever be appropriately applied to 
a judicial system?  
It is not possible to measure the 
success of the courts in terms of 
crimes not committed, accidents 
that don’t happen, disputes 
avoided by proper advice on 
compliance or by well formed 
drafting (2001:8).  
For instance, how much settlement in 
ADR is due to the fact that it’s conducted 
in the shadow of the law? This hidden fact 
emphasises that sometimes important 
results do not fit within the new 
accountabilities (Galanter & Cahill 
1993:1341).  
If ADR is cheaper, quicker and 
more efficient, are we going to see a rise in 
disputes seeking settlement? Studies 
undertaken by the RAND Institute for 
Civil Justice found that there had been no 
aggregate decline in costs or time for 
resolution of disputes with the introduction 
of ADR, thus reducing the claims for 
efficiency (Sinnar 2001; Abel 1981:246-
47). The cost of litigation has been one of 
the most influential factors in achieving 
high settlement rates and the success of the 
courts in avoiding the number of matters 
that end in a trial. In this regard it has been 
a tool of the courts, aiding in their 
successful resolution of disputes. 
This trend for reform, led by the 
United States and closely followed in the 
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UK and Australia, involves giving judges 
unprecedented control over the conduct 
of litigation (Ipp 1995). The new theory 
of management can be seen clearly in the 
new civil procedure rules implemented in 
England as a result of Lord Woolf’s 
report (1995; 1996). The concept of 
proportionality and fair allocation of 
resources introduces a realignment of the 
balance between the procedural measures 
used to reach a correct decision and the 
duration and cost of the proceedings 
(O'Brien 1999). 
This move to new priorities and 
compromise is spreading beyond 
common law systems to civil law 
systems as well (Zuckerman 2000). 
Germany and the Netherlands are two 
civil law countries where a system with 
low costs and few delays is said to have 
been achieved. In Germany this is 
achieved by state control of litigation 
fees (Coester-Waltjen & Zuckerman 
1999). In the Netherlands it is achieved 
by permitting non-lawyers to compete 
with lawyers in the provision of legal 
services (Zuckerman 2000). 
The aims of the reforms are that 
courts should no longer operate as 
institutions providing justice but as 
successful businesses. To this end the 
idea of the control of a case being left in 
the hands of the parties and their legal 
advisers is overturned and put squarely in 
control of, allegedly, the already 
overburdened judges and under-funded 
courts. It is interesting to note the reverse 
argument regarding party control is being 
touted as one of the benefits of ADR, yet 
the same system sees such an established 
tradition in the adversarial courts as a 
definite disadvantage. 
This move has placed greater 
burdens on lawyers. There is a need to 
offer no-win-no-fees, to ensure poor 
parties with legal claims may still have 
their day in court (Dixon 2002).11 A 
further requirement placed on the legal 
profession is to guarantee a claim has 
merit, or a reasonable chance of success, 
both factually and legally, before 
advancing it. The need for a claim to be 
meritorious is enforced by sanctions such 
as the lawyer paying the costs of both 
parties and potential professional 
misconduct hearings.12 Courts, acting as 
successful businesses, selling their wares 
in a competitive market place, with multi-
door options for ‘pick and choose’ dispute 
settlement, create a new burgeoning 
industry of private dispute settlement.  
 
Specific Queensland examples 
 
Lord Woolf originally proposed raising the 
standard of cases brought by ensuring that 
a case had merit before it would be heard. 
This is reflected in the UK Civil 
Procedure Rules Part 24, and the 
equivalent Queensland provision for 
summary judgement contained in Part 2 of 
the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules.13 
While, on the face of it, this sounds a 
reasonable proposition, others argue it 
sounds the death knell to our legal system 
(Abel 1981; O'Brien 1999), because it 
raises the issue of how one can ‘be 
compensated for the moral harm generated 
by the summary dismissal of a meritorious 
claim?’(O'Brien 1999:143).  
A further interesting development 
in Queensland is the use of case appraisal. 
The Supreme Court of Queensland Act 
1991, Section 102(1), entitles the court to 
refer a matter to an ADR process such as 
case appraisal. Division 4 of the Uniform 
Civil Procedure Rules provides that a case 
appraiser may decide the matter in an 
inquisitorial style, as if the court (r335(1)), 
by asking anyone for information and 
obtaining and acting on any information 
(r337(1)). The appraiser may give a 
decision without reasons (r339(1)), raising 
natural justice issues, and has the same 
power as a court to award costs (r340). 
Such decision is binding if the parties do 
not elect to go to trial (r341). This process 
has been criticised for going beyond the 
proper role of the court, and raises 
complex questions particularly where 
recalcitrant parties are involved (Dearlove 




Globalisation has led to a cross 
fertilisation of societies and the adversarial 
system has been inspired to adopt 
mechanisms used in other legal systems 
(Glenn 2000). As noted above the civil 
systems inquisitorial model of evidence 
gathering influences case appraisal in 
Queensland. Mediation approaches of 
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societies such as Japan and China are 
also influential (Jardine 1996). 
These societies in turn are 
adopting some of the influences of the 
West, using the same justifications of 
cost, efficiency and access to justice to 
move in the opposite direction towards a 
public adversarial system. While many 
western countries are cutting access to 
legal aid, China’s local and state legal aid 
initiatives have expanded since the early 
1990s (Jardine 1996). In Japan the new 
Code of Civil Procedure was enacted on 
June 18, 1996 with the justification for 
change being the need for efficiency and 
improved access to justice. It is 
interesting to note that these same 
justifications in Japan are used to achieve 
the opposite of the civil reforms in the 
West.  
Japan, a society of hierarchical 
authority, was dependent on informal 
justice to avoid conflict (Sato 2000). 
However, contemporary governments 
have recognised this led to corruption 
and sacrifice of life quality such that a 
demand has arisen for greater 
transparency and accountability, together 
with a need to economically strengthen 
the country.  Japan’s past is an example 
of where civil justice reforms may well 
lead in the West. The policy of a small 
judiciary and number of legal 
professionals, together with limited legal 
aid funding, has led to a demand in Japan 
to overturn the paternalistic system in 
favour of strengthening the adversarial 
process. Legal aid is considered the 
cornerstone for this transformation to 
transparent dispute processing and 
strengthening of the adversarial system 
and rule of law (Sato 2000).14
In the West, a society of 
individuals in which conflict is not seen 
as bad, the cultural impacts of imposing 
structured mediation cannot be dismissed 
(Wolski 1997). Condliffe (1997) makes 
the point that mediation differs between 
cultures significantly. For instance, in 
China, mediation is not constrained by 
strict time limits nor is there seen to be a 
need for a neutral third party (in fact 
often a village elder is the mediator). The 
society is also one where the importance 
of the family collective means that the 
mediation will be honoured without 
enforcement being necessary. Condliffe 
argues ADR literature is too dispute 
process focused and does not engage the 
wider considerations of the social context. 
Adopting aspects of another culture’s 
system without consideration for its 
historical socio-cultural basis leads to 
considerable complexities and is 
fundamentally flawed (Condliffe 1997:78). 
The use of ADR for conflict 
resolution, while based on the concept of 
community, may well work against the 
very groups it is advocated for. Indigenous 
societies that have had their culture and 
community diminished become further 
isolated with the imposition of reforms, 
absolving the state in relation to their 
needs. Beattie (1997:67) argues that 
disputes diverted to mediation are ones to 
which a low priority is given, such as 
community and family disputes, where the 
outcomes for the powerful are not 
immediate. Certainly, commercial disputes 
are also diverted when the powerful see it 
as in their interests to be outside the public 
law process (Galanter & Cahill 
1993:1353). Beattie goes on to point out 
that some issues need to be addressed in a 
public ceremonial way to confirm 
publicly-held principles. Social 
responsibility for issues such as 
reconciliation and poverty can be ignored 
when relegated to a private domain behind 
closed doors (Auerbach 1983; Beattie 
1997).  
Judicial activism, seen in cases 
like Mabo, that protects the powerless and 
advocates social advancement and rights 
(where legislatures fear to tread), is often 
behind state support for the move to 
informal dispute resolution and civil 
procedure reform.15 Auerbach notes:   
Nothing, it seemed, propelled 
enthusiasm for alternative dispute 
settlement like a few legal 
victories that unsettled an 
equilibrium of privilege. Once 
Native Americans litigated to 
retain tribal lands seized in 
violation of treaty rights, the 
Federal Bureau of Indian Affairs 
proclaimed the value of 
informality (1983:128). 
In a similar vein, a number of critics 
question the value of ADR for women as it 
often fails to protect and empower them 
(Grillo 1995; Sinnar 2001; Field 2001). 
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Courts already resolve many 
matters before they reach that expensive 
trial so the system is working. The 
colonising of the lifeworld with the 
increasing application of more ridged 
methodologies results only in whole new 
money-making industries. 
 
Legitimacy of the reforms 
 
Under the new structure of legitimation, 
the justice system would appear to be 
regarded as just another commodity 
whereby government accountability to its 
taxpaying constituents is used to argue a 
right to expect value for money for each 
dollar spent on justice. It becomes the 
duty of judges not only to dispense 
justice, a lifeworld substantive role, but 
to now increase through-put via case 
management, eliminate waste via referral 
to ADR and operate more efficiently by 
taking control of cases from the parties, 
using the new civil procedure rules, such 
as in the provision for case appraisal. The 
legal system, through the move to 
informalism, is moving ever deeper into 
the lifeworld by inserting itself into the 
formalising process for mediation to 
juridify ADR much as experience has 
shown with arbitration (Brooker 1999; 
Harrington 1985). Cost efficiency is 
already no longer touted as one of ADRs 
main benefits, costs already having 
become inflated (Sinnar 2001; Bingham 
2002:120). 
Legitimacy and productivity are 
at the core of Habermas’s communication 
theory, raising questions about the 
driving forces for changes, the mentality 
of the need for continual change, the 
change agents and why citizens are 
compelled to believe change is always a 
necessity. Public policy can be seen as a 
public relations exercise to educate or 
sell a policy to the public rather than a 
process involving consultation. In the 
justice reforms, the colonising media of 
bar associations, legal professionals and 
judges have been used to steer the policy 
and implement the reforms. As a result of 
the demise of government funding for 
legal aid, solicitors have stepped in by 
offering no-win-no-fees. This has been 
criticised for leading to a culture of 
litigiousness to the extent legislation now 
limits lawyers’ right to advertise the use 
of no-win-no-fees (Dixon 2002:14). At the 
same time, the use of no-win-no-fees has 
not been prohibited as governments 
recognise it fills a necessary void for those 
who could not otherwise access the courts. 
The decentralisation of informal 
dispute resolution providers suits the 
commercial world that wishes to resolve 
its disputes outside the legal system.16 A 
number of questions require consideration. 
Is this a scheme to privatise justice and 
absolve government from responsibility 
for something that is a core duty of 
government (Moore 2003) in fact an arm 
of government?  Is a limb being cut off 
because it irritates the other parts, such as 
the executive in its desire for power and 
the legislature in what it argues as its 
democratic right to be the only law maker 
(Auerbach 1983:120-28)? Is this attack an 
attempt to subvert the democratic process 
in favour of select business interest? 
Insurance companies benefit from 
mediated settlements financially but also 
from increased demand for private 
insurance against legal costs ( Dixon 
2002:10-12; Regan 2000). Other insidious 
developments are the in-house dispute 
settlement mechanisms for work related 
disputes where there is a large power 
imbalance (Bingham 2002:101-08). 
The lack of democratic process in 
the form of public discussion of the 
directions public institutions are taking is a 
concern of Habermas. Whereas the denial 
of privatisation of the justice system is the 
rhetoric, the reality may see it occur 
without public awareness and 
consideration of the implications.  The 
judicial activism of the courts in reforming 
the law and dealing with big political 
questions in protecting rights such as in 
Mabo and issues surrounding illegal 
immigrants leads to the executives’ desire 
to overcome this.17 Protection of rights by 
the courts is threatening to the status quo 
and therefore seen as threatening to 
commercial activity (Abel 1981:257-58). 
Where the ideal of the rule of law, namely 
justice for all determined by an impartial 
adjudicator, seemingly exits, a 
countervailing action often arises. The 
silencing of opposition to capitalist 
interests is identified by Habermas, in his 
theory of distorted communication, as 
occurring for political reasons. 
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 Domingo (1997) argues the 
strongest demand for reform comes from 
the economic elites, such as foreign 
investors and international financial 
institutions. Such parties’ interest lies in 
strengthening the legal framework of 
private property. The economic elites’ 
greater bargaining power results in 
reforms to the legal system that suits 
economic concerns only.  
People feel overwhelmed by a 
global system that threatens human 
identity and leaves them feeling helpless, 
having lost control. A universal emotion 
in the West is one of fear and loss of 
community connectedness and reason. 
The space where community problem 
solving has always gone on outside of the 
law is now invaded in the move to 
informalism (Abel 1981; Beattie 1997). 
The distorted communication encourages 
parties’ to believe it is for their benefit 
giving them greater access and control, 
yet in reality it results in the invasion by 
the state of the private social sphere of 
the citizen (Abel 1981).  
There is little evidence from past 
experiments in civil procedure reforms of 
success in overcoming the efficiency 
‘problems’ facing the public justice 
system (Abel 1981). While the waiting 
lists for courts may have lessened, as a 
result of diversionary tactics, there is now 
concern by parties that court enforced 
mediation increases the time and cost 
before a matter can be resolved by court 
adjudication if it does not settle. 




Critical theory provides a means by 
which to contrast distorted 
communications of the agenda-setting 
power elites with the ordinary 
communication of consensus and mutual 
understanding. It is argued the civil 
procedure reforms have been more to do 
with government reducing its expenditure 
and expanding its control than they have 
been with a concern to provide fair, quick 
and cheap access to justice.  
The problematising of the 
judicial system and the consequent 
reforms diminish substantive public 
rights and lead to criticisms such as the 
development of a two-tier system of 
justice. One system is for the poor, where 
access to adjudication is denied at a cost of 
greater invasion of their social space 
through informalism. A second system for 
the wealthy, allowing them to work 
outside the legal system.  The economic 
theories of allocative efficiency, which 
require the maximum use of resources at 
the least possible cost, or X-efficiency 
theory, relying on cost efficiencies 
achieved through organisational 
efficiency, provide the system language 
which invades and distorts the realities of 
the lifeworld. This suits the agenda-setters 
ideological needs but does not encapsulate 
the needs of all citizens in a democracy. 
Such a result certainly weakens the 
concept of a rule of law in which all 
citizens are equal.  
The new civil procedure reforms 
reflect the colonising power of accounting 
practices leading to the proliferation of 
ADR in the form of many organisations 
offering different services. These 
providers compete in their desire to 
explore business opportunities and, 
contrary to free market ideology, this leads 
to an increase in costs. Substantial 
beneficiaries of the reforms are not only 
government but also powerful business 
groups.  
ADR is a natural process of itself 
but its uptake by the courts in their drive to 
efficiency and cost reductions under the 
influence of neo-liberalism invades a 
social space in which dispute resolution 
always went on. Habermas’s approach to 
discussion of the introduction of 
accounting into the public sector provides 
a mechanism for uncovering an evaluative 




                                                          
1 ‘The court’s overriding responsibilities 
include “fixing timetables or otherwise 
controlling the progress of the case” and 
“giving directions to ensure that the trial of the 
case proceeds quickly and efficiently” 
(Andrews 2000:32).  
2  ‘The application of performance indicators 
throughout the advanced industrial world, 
schools, universities and hospitals are reaping a 
whirlwind of the new managerialism which 
determines, budgets and tenure on measurable 
performance indicators alone leading to the 
wholesale downgrading of the importance of 
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humanities at universities for example.’ 
(Spigelman 2001:4).  
3 Note comments regarding the exclusion of 
Judges from consultation on the draft 
proposals and the civil justice reform with 
such matters being put in the hands of 
politicians as opposed to the judges for the 
first time in Davis (1997:5); and also ‘I was 
summoned to a meeting with the Attorney 
General last Friday at 12 noon...regarding the 
Governments reform package...we expressed 
our concern about...the speed with which the 
proposal was put together...without due 
consultation with QLS...at 10am this morning 
we were advised...that the AG would be 
releasing a package dealing with legal 
professional reform after the cabinet meeting 
today’ (Sullivan 2003). 
4 Harris supports the move to a growing 
private market in legal advice and services 
but also acknowledges that the application of 
market rules to the courts gives rise to 
questions concerning ethics and 
constitutional issues (2000). 
5 For a further example of the Queensland 
State Governments provision of 
governmental services through private 
contracts in the area of correctional services 
see Macionis (1997).  
6  A very revealing study, the first large-scale 
national survey conducted in two decades in 
the US regarding the legal needs of 
Americans and the steps they do/do not take 
to meet those needs, shows that 
approximately half of the households 
surveyed faced a legal issue within a 12 
month period and the predominance of 
concerns irrespective of level of income 
where in areas concerning personal finances, 
consumer issues, housing and real property. 
Legal needs that ended in the civil justice 
system were seen as having been 
satisfactorily resolved more than those that 
did not. Evaluations of the performance of 
lawyers over 6 different criteria showed more 
than half of both low and moderate income 
households as being completely satisfied, 
with especially high ratings for the lawyers 
honesty in dealing with the client ( Legal 
Needs and Civil Justice: A survey of 
Americans prepared for the American Bar 
Association 1994)  
7 Schultz (2003) states ‘Despite all these 
changes, insurance premiums continue to 
rise...IAG...announced a first half yearly 
profit of $62m. Suncorp’s ..profits increased 
by 91 percent’.  
8 (1992) 175 CLR 1. 
9 Tasson confirms the belief that the system 
has, through the process of juridification, 
invaded the lifeworld of ADR and is 
pessimistic about the possibility of the 
 
lifeworld being able to fight off the 
colonisation to reclaim the process of informal 
dispute resolution to the social world, where 
not every daily experience need be reduced to 
a legal issue (1999:2). 
10 [1932] AC 562; ‘Where would we be if a 
certain ginger beer manufacturer had in 1932 
chosen to mediate with a dissatisfied 
customer?’ (Hanger 2002: 4) 
11 No-win-no-fee situations, while recognised 
as necessary by the Queensland government, 
are curtailed by the limiting of lawyers ability 
to advertise. See Part 1 of the Personal Injuries 
Proceedings Act 2002 Qld. 
12 Examples can be found in Rule 11 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, discussed in 
Ipp (1995:705) and the Civil Liability Act 2002 
(NSW) discussed in Clark (2002:75).  
13 QLD Rule 292(1) provides that: ‘The court 
may give judgement for the plaintiff.. if the 
court is satisfied- 
a) the plaintiff... is entitled to all or part of 
the relief sought.. 
b) the defendant has no defence other than in 
relation to  the amount of the claim;  
 and 
c) there is no need for a trial of the 
proceeding. 
Rule 293(2) Also, the court may give any 
judgement or make any other order the court 
considers appropriate if satisfied – 
a) no reasonable cause of action is disclosed; 
or 
b) the proceeding is frivolous, vexatious or 
an abuse of the process of the court; or 
c) the defendant has a defence to the 
proceeding. 
14 If the West aims for speedy justice the 
Japanese system provides a good example- 
there a typical case lasts for 3 minutes (Sato 
2000:243). 
15 ‘There is a growing concern that government 
is intruding in almost all aspects of life and 
courts are the political constraints on the 
conduct of the executive’ (McHugh 2003:111).  
16 A survey of Fortune 1000 companies 
indicated a strong preference for mediation 
over arbitration and other fact-and-law based 
dispute resolution (Bingham 2002:1:110).  
17 A great cause of tension with the Judiciary is 
the Executives desire to exercise exclusive 
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